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THE CONUNDRUM OF PHOENIX ACTIVITY: IS FURTHER REFORM NECESSARY?  
Anne Matthew 
Phoenix activity presents a conundrum for the law and its regulators. While there is 
economic cost associated with all phoenix activity, the underlying behaviour is not always 
illegal. A transaction with indicators of phoenix activity may be an entirely innocent and 
well-intentioned display of entrepreneurial spirit, albeit one that has ended in failure. 
Restructuring post business failure is not illegal per se. Recent reforms targeting phoenix 
activity fail to grapple with the vast range of behaviour that can be described as phoenix 
activity since they do not differentiate between legal and illegal activity. This article 
explores the importance of the distinction between legal and illegal phoenix activity, the 
extent to which the existing law captures a range of behaviour that can be described as 
illegal phoenix activity and the response of key regulators and governmental bodies to the 
absence of single law that attempts to define illegal phoenix activity.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate phoenix activity is estimated to cost the Australian economy $1-3 billion 
dollars each year.1 It poses a significant threat to confidence in our economy. Despite 20 
years of review,2 inquiry,3 targeted regulatory operations4 and the implementation of 
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1Fair	 Work	 Ombudsman,	 Phoenix	 Activity:	 Sizing	 the	 Problem	 and	 Matching	 Solutions	
(2012)	 (‘Fair	 Work	 Ombudsman	 Report’);	 Australian	 Taxation	 Office	 (‘ATO’),	 ‘Phoenix	
practices	are	on	the	radar’,	Targeting	tax	crime:	A	whole	of	government	approach,	issue	1,	
July	1999	(‘Phoenix	practices	are	on	the	radar’);	Australian	Securities	Commission	(‘ASC’),	
Phoenix	Companies	and	Insolvent	Trading,	Research	Paper	No	95/01,	 July	1996	 (‘Phoenix	
Companies	and	Insolvent	Trading’).	
2	Law	Reform	Committee	of	the	Parliament	of	Victoria,	Curbing	the	Phoenix	Company:	First	
Report	 on	 the	 Law	Relating	 to	Directors	and	Managers	 of	 Insolvent	Corporations	 (1994)	
http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/images/stories/committees/lawrefrom/phoenix/first_
report.pdf;	Law	Reform	Committee,	Parliament	of	Victoria,	Curbing	the	Phoenix	Company:	
Second	Report	 on	 the	 Law	Relating	 to	Directors	 and	Managers	 of	 Insolvent	 Corporations	
(1995)	
http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/images/stories/committees/lawrefrom/phoenix/seco
nd_report.pdf;	 Law	 Reform	 Committee,	 Parliament	 of	 Victoria,	 Curbing	 the	 Phoenix	
Company:	 Third	 Report	 on	 the	 Law	 Relating	 to	 Directors	 and	 Managers	 of	 Insolvent	
Corporations	 (1995)	
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piecemeal legislative reforms,5 existing legal structures are generally still considered 
inadequate to deal with phoenix activity. Regulators have reacted in a manner that 
demonstrates a perceived void in the legal framework,6 while bills proposing reform 
have languished amid doubts as to their potential effectiveness. 7  The Productivity 
                                                                                                      
http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/images/stories/committees/lawrefrom/phoenix/thir
d_report.pdf;	ASC,	 Phoenix	Companies	and	 Insolvent	Trading,	Research	 Paper	 No	 95/01,	
July	 1996;	 Parliamentary	 Joint	 Committee	 on	 Corporations	 and	 Financial	 Services,	
Corporate	 Insolvency	 Laws:	 A	 Stocktake	 (June	 2004),	 (‘Corporate	 Insolvency	 Laws:	 A	
Stocktake’);	 Australian	 Government,	 Action	against	 fraudulent	phoenix	activity,	Proposals	
Paper,	November	2009.	
3	Commonwealth,	 Cole	 Royal	 Commission	 into	 the	 Building	 and	 Construction	 Industry,	
into	the	Building	and	Construction	Industry,	Final	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission	into	the	
Building	and	Construction	Industry,	February	 2003:	 Volume	 8,	 Reform	 –	 National	 Issues,	
Part	 2,	 Chapter	 11	 Payroll	Tax	Obligations,	Chapter	 12,	 Phoenix	 companies	 (‘Cole	 Final	
Report’);	 Hansard,	 Commonwealth,	 Senate,	 Reference	 to	 the	 Economics	 References	
Committee,	Insolvency	in	the	Australian	Construction	Industry,	4	December	2014,	10201	
(‘Insolvency	 in	 the	 Australian	 Construction	 Industry’).	 This	 inquiry,	 referred	 by	 Senator	
McEwan	to	the	Economics	References	Committee	for	inquiry	and	report	by	11	November	
2015,	 will	 specifically	 target	 ‘the	 incidence	 of	 phoenix	 companies	 in	 the	 construction	
industry,	their	operation,	their	effects	and	the	adequacy	of	the	current	law	and	regulatory	
frameworks	 to	 curb	 the	 practice	 of	 phoenixing’.	 See	
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Insolve
ncy_construction.	
4	ASC	 surveillance	 program,	 1992‐1993,	 ASC	 Annual	 Report	 1992‐1993,	 31;	 Operation	
Westgate	1999‐2000,	see	testimony	of	J	Orchard,	ASIC	Director,	Enforcement	testified	as	
to	 the	 details	 of	 the	 operation	 before	 the	 Cole	 Royal	 Commission,	 Cole	 Final	 Report,	
Volume	8,	Part	2,	Chapter	12,	Phoenix	companies,	p144;	Nick	Sherry,	‘Immediate	Action	to	
assist	 in	 crackdown	 on	 fraudulent	 phoenix	 activity’,	 Media	 Release	 45,	 17	 March	 2010	
http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2010/045.htm&pa
geID=003&min=njsa&Year=&DocType;	Hansard,	 Joint	Committee	of	Public	Accounts	and	
Audit,	22/4/2010	Biannual	hearing	with	Commissioner	of	Taxation,	PA24;	ATO,	n1	at	16.		
5	Tax	Laws	Amendment	(Transfer	of	Provisions)	Act	2010	(Cth);	Tax	Laws	Amendment	(2011	
Measures	No	8)	Act	2011	(Cth);	Pay	as	You	Go	Withholding	Non‐compliance	Bill	2011	(Cth)	
lapsed	 at	 dissolution	 on	 5	 August	 2013	
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/R
esult?bId=r4690&print=1;	Tax	Laws	Amendment	(2012	Measures	No	2)	Act	2012	(Cth);	The	
Corporations	Amendment	 (Phoenixing	and	Other	Measures)	Act	2012	 (Cth);	 Corporations	
Amendment	(Similar	Names)	Bill	2012	(Cth).	
6	This	 is	 illustrated	via	the	formation	and	operation	of	the	Phoenix	Taskforce,	previously	
called	the	Inter‐Agency	Phoenix	Forum	is	discussed	below.		
7	For	example,	Corporations	Amendment	(Similar	Names)	Bill	2012	(Cth).	
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Commission’s draft report has called for further reform addressing the detection and 
enforcement burden presented by phoenix activity.8  
Phoenix activity is difficult to define as it can take a wide variety of forms not all of 
which are illegal.9 The primary identifiers of phoenix activity are a deliberate and often 
cyclical misuse of the corporate form accompanied by a fraudulent scheme to evade 
creditors.10 It is most often triggered by an imminent or actual solvency crisis. The 
business or assets may be stripped from an existing company structure and transferred 
to a related or new company, leaving the existing company to be wound up or left an 
abandoned, assetless shell. Inevitably unsatisfied creditors are left behind; the list likely 
to include the Australian Taxation Office (‘ATO’), trade creditors and employees.  
The mischief of illegal or fraudulent phoenix activity is that the new company, or 
related company rises like the phoenix from the ashes, debt-free, to continue the 
economic enterprise of the previous company. Those behind the corporate veil are 
protected by limited liability and the doctrine of the separate legal entity from claims of 
the previous company’s unsatisfied creditors.  
                                   
8 	Australian	 Government,	 Productivity	 Commission,	 ‘Business	 Set‐up,	 Transfer	 and	
Closure’,	 Draft	 Report,	 May	 2015,	 (‘Business	 Set‐up,	 Transfer	 and	 Closure’)	
http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/current/business/draft.		
9	Business	Set‐up,	Transfer	and	Closure,	n	8	379‐380;	See	Anderson	H,	O’Connell	A,	Ramsay	
I,	 Welsh	 M,	 Withers	 H,	 Defining	and	Profiling	Phoenix	Activity	 (Melbourne	 Law	 School,	
December	2014).	This	report	was	developed	as	part	of	ARC	Discovery	Project	140102277,	
‘Phoenix	Activity:	Regulating	Fraudulent	Use	of	the	Corporate	Form’;	Roach	M,	‘Combating	
the	Phoenix	Phenomenon:	An	Analysis	of	International	Approaches’	(2010)	8	(2)	eJournal	
of	Tax	Research	90,	91.	
10	This	is	consistent	with	definitions	of	phoenix	activity	proffered	by	a	number	of	scholars	
researching	 in	 this	 area	 including:	 Anderson	 H,	 ‘The	 Proposed	 Deterrence	 of	 Phoenix	
Activity:	 An	 Opportunity	 Lost’	 (2012)	 34	 Sydney	 Law	 Review	 411,	 412;	 Anderson	 H,	
‘Corporate	 Insolvency	 and	 the	 protection	 of	 lost	 employee	 entitlements:	 Issues	 in	
enforcement’	(2013)	26	Australian	Journal	of	Labour	Law	75,	79;	Coburn	N,	 ‘The	Phoenix	
Reexamined’	(1998)	8	Australian	Journal	of	Corporate	Law	1;	Morrison	D,	‘The	Addition	of	
Uncommercial	Transactions	 to	 s588G	and	 its	 Implications	 for	Phoenix	Activities’	 (2002)	
10	Insolvency	Law	Journal	229;	Roach,	n	9;	Rotem	Y,	‘Small	business	financial	distress	and	
the	“Phoenix	Syndrome”	–	A	Re‐evaluation’	(2012)	 INSOL	International	Insolvency	Review	
1,	3‐4;	Symes	C	and	Simpson	M,	‘Phoenix	companies	and	the	AA	fund’	(2012)	20	Insolvency	
Law	Journal	227;	 Tomasic	 R,	 ‘Phoenix	 Companies	 and	 Corporate	 Regulatory	 Challenges’	
(1996)	 6	 Australian	 Journal	of	Corporate	Law	 461;	 Tomasic	 R,	 ‘Phoenix	 Companies	 and	
Rogue	Directors’	(1995)	5	Australian	Journal	of	Corporate	Law	474.	
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The conundrum presented by phoenix activity is that not all phoenix activity is 
fraudulent or otherwise illegal. A transaction with all the indicators of phoenix activity 
can also be an entirely innocent and well-intentioned display of entrepreneurial spirit; 
albeit one that has ended in failure. Legal phoenix activity may take the form of 
legitimate business restructuring that does not involve the perpetration of fraud on 
creditors. 11 The hallmark of legal phoenix activity is honesty.  
The law has long recognised the potential for illegality in the governance of 
corporations, particularly those facing financial distress. Given the extent of the efforts 
over the past 20 years to address phoenix activity, one might assume that it is not 
adequately dealt with by the present law. Yet, depending upon the form it takes, illegal 
phoenix activity is captured by an extensive range of corporate,12 tax,13 employment14 
                                   
11	See	Fair	Work	Ombudsman	Report,	n	1	at	56‐57;	Anderson	H,	et	al,	n	9,	at	8‐9.		
12	For	 example,	 engagement	 in	 illegal	 phoenix	 activity	 may	 constitute	 a	 breach	 of	 the	
duties	directors	owe	to	the	company	at	general	law	and	pursuant	to	Corporations	Act	2001	
(Cth),	ss	180‐184.	Third	parties	involved	in	phoenix	activity	in	contravention	or	breach	of	
these	 duties	 may	 also	 be	 in	 contravention	 of	 the	 Act:	 ss	 79,	 181(2),	 182(2),	 183(2),	
588G(2).	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 illegal	 phoenix	 activity	 amounts	 to	 a	 fraudulent	 scheme	 to	
avoid	 debts,	 fraud	 is	 a	 well‐accepted	 basis	 for	 piercing	 the	 corporate	 veil.	 See	Briggs	v	
James	Hardie	 (1989)	 16	 NSWLR	 549	 at	 567.	 The	 Corporations	Act	 2001	 (Cth)	 is	 well	
equipped	with	provisions	addressing	behaviour	common	in	illegal	phoenix	activity	such	as	
asset‐stripping	(ss	588FB(1),	ss	588FE,	588FC),	insolvent	trading	(s	588G),	failure	to	make	
forthright	disclosures	(ss475	and	530A),	falsification	of	books	and	records	(ss	286,	1307),	
preventing	recovery	or	reducing	employee	entitlements	(ss	596AB,	596AC(2)),	and	fraud	
(s	596).	Relevant	administrative	powers	conferred	on	ASIC	by	the	Corporations	Act	2001	
(Cth)	 include	 the	 disqualification	 power	 (s206F)	 and	 the	 power	 to	wind	 up	 abandoned	
companies	(s489EA).		
13	For	example,	illegal	phoenix	activity	can	constitute	an	offence	under	Part	III	of	the	Tax	
Administration	Act	1953	(Cth).	To	the	extent	that	the	phoenix	activity	involves	a	scheme	to	
avoid	taxation,	 it	may	trigger	the	provisions	of	 the	Income	Tax	Assessment	Act	(Cth),	Part	
IVA.	 	 Non‐compliance	 with	 director	 penalty	 notices	 can	 ultimately	 lead	 to	 the	 director	
being	 personally	 liable	 for	 certain	 unmet	 obligations	 of	 the	 company:	 Taxation	
Administration	Act	1953	 (Cth),	Division	269,	Schedule	1.	Security	deposits	for	an	existing	
or	 future	 tax‐related	 liability	could	be	used	to	secure	against	 liabilities	 that	may	arise	 in	
phoenix	 activity:	 Tax	 Administration	 Act	 1953	 (Cth),	 Schedule	 1,	 s255D.	 For	 a	
comprehensive	 analysis	 of	 security	 deposits,	 see	 Broderick,	 M,	 ‘Legislative	 change	 to	
director	penalty	notices	and	security	for	tax	payments’	(2011)	40	AT	Review	60,	63.	
14	For	example,	where	phoenix	activity	manifests	in	an	avoidance	of	the	obligation	to	pay	
employee	 entitlements	 this	may	 amount	 to	 the	 contravention	 of	 a	 modern	 award:	 Fair	
Work	Act	2009	(Cth),	s45.	
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and criminal law.15 While there is a range of conduct along a spectrum ranging from 
immoral to illegal behaviour underlying phoenix activity, this article takes the view that 
the law addresses illegal conduct all along that spectrum.16 There do not appear to be 
any gaps in the law, such that there is phoenix behaviour which ought to be illegal, but 
which attracts no consequences because there is no law addressing it. Additional law 
seems unnecessary. The sheer extent of the law applying to the illegality underlying 
phoenix activity suggests that a focus on enforcement and detection would be effective 
in addressing illegal phoenix activity.  
Reforms targeting phoenix activity to date tend to overlook that most illegal phoenix 
activity is a flagrant breach of existing law. Reform does not appear to have acted as a 
panacea to deter phoenix behaviour nor has it alleviated the detection and enforcement 
burdens imposed upon regulators by the existing law. 17 This remains problematic given 
the shrinking budgets and decreasing manpower of key regulators and government 
bodies.  
The most recent reforms targeting phoenix activity include a power conferred on the 
regulator to wind up abandoned companies to facilitate claims for unpaid employee 
entitlements.18 This reform makes no allowance for legitimate, honest business failure. 
Even a company engaged in legal phoenix activity may be wound up if it is an 
abandoned company. Further reforms include amendment to the director penalty regime 
that can lead ultimately to personal liability for certain unpaid taxes and superannuation 
                                   
15	For	 example,	 just	 as	 phoenix	 activity	 may	 lead	 to	 reticence	 to	 make	 forthright	
disclosures	required	by	the	Corporations	Act	2001	(Cth),	it	may	also	manifest	in	providing	
false	or	misleading	 information	 to	a	Commonwealth	entity	such	as	ASIC,	 the	ATO	or	 the	
FWO,	forgery	or	the	production	of	false	or	misleading	documents	in	purported	compliance	
with	a	Commonwealth	law:	Criminal	Code	Act	1995	(Cth),	s137,	144,	145.			
16	For	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	spectrum	of	phoenix	activity	see	Anderson	H,	et	al,	
n	9,	at	2‐8.	
17	It	 is	 difficult	 to	 ascertain	with	 precision	whether	 phoenix	 activity	 is	 on	 the	 rise	 since	
there	 is	 a	 little	 available	 data	 as	 to	 what	 proportion	 of	 external	 administrations	 reveal	
phoenix	activity.	This	statement	is	based	on	comments	made	in	the	Fair	Work	Ombudsman	
Report,	that	the	scale	and	cost	of	phoenix	activity	is	on	the	rise.	See	Fair	Work	Ombudsman	
Report,	above	n	1,	2.		
18	See	 Corporations	 Act	 2001	 (Cth),	 s489EA	 inserted	 by	 the	 Corporations	 Amendment	
(Phoenixing	and	Other	Measures)	Act	2012	(Cth).		
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guarantee amounts.19 Imposing personal liability on directors for some, but not all of the 
company’s unpaid debts, creates a subclass of unsecured creditors.  
These reforms cast a net so wide that they do not seek to distinguish between illegal and 
legal phoenix activity, but instead focus on the existence of certain unpaid debts or the 
abandonment of the company. The distinction is a critical one, since it is not generally 
illegal for a company to fail. Developed capitalist economies typically feature an 
insolvency law regime that supports legal business failure.20 The nature of enterprise is 
such that not all businesses will succeed. Entrepreneurs, investors and creditors all 
assume risk, presumably proportionate to their confidence in the venture’s success. 
Some unsecured creditors take on a disproportionate risk since they are far more 
vulnerable than others. As a vehicle for encouraging business, the corporate form has 
been remarkably effective and efficient in managing some of these risks. Centuries of 
economic development can be closely linked to the complex structures and protections 
afforded by incorporation, particularly the limited liability company and theories of 
corporate law that embrace the company as a separate legal entity. Confidence in 
economic enterprise is multifaceted yet friable. Law reform designed to affect the 
behaviour of companies ought to be contextualised in this broader economic 
framework. While concerns for unsecured creditors should not be ignored, they should 
only be one factor informing consideration of the impact of law reform. 
This article begins by exploring the nature of phoenix activity, the distinction between 
legal and illegal phoenix activity and the reaction of key regulators and governmental 
bodies to the absence of a single law that attempts to define phoenix activity. The law 
applying to the illegal behaviour underlying phoenix activity will then be examined. 
                                   
19	See	Tax	Laws	Amendment	(Transfer	of	Provisions)	Act	2010	(Cth).		
20	Fletcher,	I,	‘The	Genesis	of	Modern	Insolvency	Law’	(1989)	Journal	of	Business	Law	365;	
Halliday,	 TC	 and	 Carruthers,	 BG,	 ‘The	 Moral	 Regulation	 of	 Markets:	 Professions,	
Privatization	 and	 the	 English	 Insolvency	 Act	 1986’	 (1996)	 21	 (4)	 Accounting,	
Organizations	and	Society	371;	Martin,	N,	 ‘The	Role	of	History	and	Culture	 in	Developing	
Bankruptcy	 and	 Insolvency	 Systems’	 (2005)	 28	 Boston	 College	 International	 and	
Competition	 Law	 Review	 1;	 Lee	 S	 et	 al,	 ‘Bankruptcy	 Law	 and	 Entrepreneurship	
Development’	 (2007)	 32	 (1)	Academy	of	Management	Review	 257;	 Safley,	 TM,	 ‘Business	
Failure	and	Civil	Scandal	 in	Early	Modern	Europe’	 (2009)	83	(1)	Business	History	Review	
35.	
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This paper takes as its central premise that the existing law captures illegal behaviour 
falling within the ambit of phoenix activity. While enforcement of this law may place a 
high burden on regulators seeking to detect transgressions, that does not necessarily 
speak to the inadequacy of the law per se.21  
THE NATURE OF PHOENIX ACTIVITY 
2. DEFINING PHOENIX ACTIVITY 
There is no law in Australia that defines ‘phoenix activity’, nor declares it illegal. 
Phoenix activity is an operational term, not a legal one. A range of law exists that 
applies to the underlying illegal behavior that may be present in phoenix activity. That 
law, as it applies to phoenix activity, will be considered below.  
The sheer range of conduct that can amount to illegal or fraudulent phoenix activity was 
considered by Price Waterhouse Coopers in its 2012 report prepared for the Fair Work 
Ombudsman: ‘Phoenix Activity: Sizing the problem and matching solutions’ (‘Fair 
Work Ombudsman Report’). 22  The cost estimates in that report are premised on 
observations that phoenix activity is difficult to identify, and that there is little data 
available on the ‘incidence of phoenix activity and its impact’.23  
In this part, a review will be undertaken of attempts to define phoenix activity. This part 
will commence with a consideration of the regulatory approach to defining phoenix 
activity. This will be followed by a consideration of the seminal literature in this area 
that demonstrates the dilemma presented by defining phoenix activity. The concept of 
phoenix activity is best understood and defined by examples of behaviour that are 
considered to amount to phoenix activity. An ostensive approach to definition will be 
considered. 
                                   
21	See	Business	Set‐up,	Transfer	and	Closure,	n	9	at	382.	
22	Fair	Work	Ombudsman	Report,	n	1	at	14‐15.	
23	Fair	Work	Ombudsman	Report,	 n	 1	 at	 15.	 The	 findings	of	 this	 report	will	 be	discussed	
below.	
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2.1. A RANGE OF DEFINITIONS OF PHOENIX ACTIVITY   
2.1.1. A REGULATORY APPROACH  
A number of regulators have defined phoenix activity; these operational definitions 
have no statutory basis. According to a Parliamentary Joint Committee in 2004, phoenix 
activity is ‘intended to deny unsecured creditors equal access to the entity’s assets in 
order to meet unpaid debts’.24  
The Inter-Agency Phoenix Forum is a co-operation between various government 
agencies each seeking to combat phoenix behaviour.25 The agencies involved meet to 
share intelligence and experience with a view to detecting and deterring phoenix 
activity. The Forum has an extensive membership, including the ATO, ASIC, the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), the Australian Crime 
Commission, the Australian Federal Police, the Clean Energy Regulator, the 
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, the Department of the 
Environment, Fair Work Building and Construction, Fair Work Ombudsman and the 
various State and Territory revenue offices. The forum has not agreed on a collective 
definition of phoenix activity. Rather, members have adopted different operational 
definitions that suit and target their regulatory operation.26 A selection of definitions of 
phoenix activity appears on the Inter-Agency Phoenix Forum webpage. Here ASIC 
defines phoenix activity in broad terms: 
Phoenix activity involves the systematic act of transferring assets from an indebted 
company that has or will be wound up, into a new corporate structure that has the same 
directors or company officers. As a consequence of this conduct, the directors or 
company officers avoid paying outstanding liabilities owed to creditors, employees and 
                                   
24	Parliamentary	 Joint	 Committee	 on	 Corporations	 and	 Financial	 Services,	 Corporate	
Insolvency	Laws:	A	Stocktake,	n	2	at	131.	
25	Information	 about	 the	 Inter‐Agency	 Phoenix	 Forum	 is	 available	 on	 the	 ATO	website:	
https://www.ato.gov.au/General/The‐fight‐against‐tax‐crime/In‐detail/Inter‐Agency‐
Phoenix‐Forum/Inter‐Agency‐Phoenix‐Forum/.	
26	The	Forum’s	webpage	resides	on	 the	ATO	website	alongside	other	 information	on	 the	
fight	 against	 tax	 crime:	 https://www.ato.gov.au/General/The‐fight‐against‐tax‐crime/In‐
detail/Inter‐Agency‐Phoenix‐Forum/Inter‐Agency‐Phoenix‐Forum/.		
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statutory bodies incurred by the company that has been wound up, while continuing the 
same or similar business activities using the newly established company.27 
The ATO’s definition of ‘fraudulent phoenix activity’ refers specifically to tax evasion 
or the evasion of superannuation guarantee liabilities, ‘through the deliberate, 
systematic and sometimes cyclic liquidation of related corporate trading entities’.28 This 
definition includes the notion of the phoenix activity being cyclical. 
The Clean Energy Regulator has a very specific definition of phoenix activity that 
extends to evading legal or regulatory responsibility: 
Fraudulent phoenix activity involves the deliberate transfer of control of a business 
from one corporate structure to another, for the purposes of evading liability or 
regulatory responsibilities under laws administered by the Clean Energy Regulator.29 
The Department of the Environment highlights ‘serious consequences for people who 
promote or intentionally participate in fraudulent phoenix activity including criminal 
conventions, custodial sentences and hefty fines’. 30  This department actively 
participates in the Inter-Agency Phoenix Forum in order to share information it is 
legally permitted to disclose and to address the risk of phoenix activity. 31  The 
Department of Environment has a highly specific definition of phoenix activity on the 
Inter-Agency Phoenix Forum website: 
                                   
27	ATO,	 Consultation:	 Business,	 Interagency	 Phoenix	 Forum,	 What	 is	 Phoenix	 Activity	
https://www.ato.gov.au/General/The‐fight‐against‐tax‐crime/In‐detail/Inter‐Agency‐
Phoenix‐Forum/Inter‐Agency‐Phoenix‐Forum/.	
28	ATO,	Consultation:	Business,	Interagency	Phoenix	Forum,	What	is	Phoenix	Activity,	n	27.	
29	ATO,	Consultation:	Business,	Interagency	Phoenix	Forum,	What	is	Phoenix	Activity,	n	27.	
30	Department	of	 the	Environment,	Accountability	and	Reportability,	Fraudulent	Phoenix	
Companies,	http://www.environment.gov.au/node/34777.	
31	At	the	time	of	the	formation	of	the	Inter‐Agency	Phoenix	Forum,	the	Department	of	the	
Environment	was	then	the	Department	of	Sustainability,	Environment,	Water,	Population	
and	 Communities	 (DSEWPaC).	 DSEWPaC	 was	 abolished	 in	 September	 2013	 by	
Administrative	 Arrangements	 Order	 and	 the	 functions	 of	 the	 Department,	 at	 least	 in	
relation	to	environmental	matters,	were	taken	over	by	a	new	department,	the	Department	
of	 the	 Environment.	 See:	 Australian	 Government,	 National	 Archives	 of	 Australia,	
http://naa12.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/AgencyDetail.aspx?r
eg_no=CA%209334.	
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Phoenix activity is the act of a corporate entity involved in the building and 
construction industry seeking to exploit the protection of administration and insolvency 
in order to avoid the payment of wages and other entitlements to works employed by 
the entity. Generally, the entity will reappear with a new identity, but with the same 
individuals behind it, a similar structure, and often undertaking the same activities.32 
A second definition of phoenix activity, in broader terms, appears on the Department of 
the Environment’s own webpage:  
Fraudulent phoenix activity is where a company deliberately liquidates to avoid paying 
creditors and then carries on the same or similar business with the same ownership, via 
another entity.33  
ASIC has other, slightly different, operational definitions of phoenix activity on its own 
website and in its annual reports. 34  The website definition, for example, describes 
phoenix activity as a serious crime that may result in company officers being 
imprisoned:  
Illegal phoenix activity involves the intention transfer of assets from an indebted 
company to a new company to avoid paying creditors, tax or employee entitlements. 
The directors leave the debts with the old company, often placing that company into 
administration or liquidation, leaving no assets to pay creditors. Meanwhile, a new 
company, often operated by the same directors and in the same industry as the old 
company, continues the business under a new structure. By engaging in this illegal 
practice, the directors avoid paying debts are that owed to creditors, employees and 
statutory bodies (e.g. the ATO).35 
                                   
32	ATO,	Consultation:	Business,	Interagency	Phoenix	Forum,	What	is	Phoenix	Activity,	n	27.	
33	Department	of	 the	Environment,	Accountability	and	Reportability,	Fraudulent	Phoenix	
Companies,	n	23.	
34	See	for	example,	ASIC,	Annual	Report,	2012‐2013,	161,	where	phoenix	activity	is	defined	
in	 the	glossary	of	 terms.	The	same	definition	appears	 in	 the	glossary	of	 the	most	 recent	
subsequent	ASIC,	Annual	Report,	2013‐2014,	171.		
35 	ASIC,	 Small	 Business	 Illegal	 Phoenix	 Activity	 http://www.asic.gov.au/for‐
business/your‐business/small‐business/compliance‐for‐small‐business/small‐business‐
illegal‐phoenix‐activity/.	
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Similarly, ASIC acknowledges that illegal phoenix activity ‘can take many forms’.36 In 
a manner suggestive of difficulties crafting an exhaustive definition, ASIC lists three 
key characteristics that can be used to identify illegal phoenix activity:  
The company fails and is unable to pay its debts. The company acts in a manner that 
intentionally denies unsecured creditors equal access to the company’s assets to meet 
and pay debts. Soon after failure of the initial company (usually within 12 months), a 
new company commences which may use some or all of the assets of the former 
business and is controlled by parties related to either the management or directors of the 
previous company.37 
A subtle difference in nomenclature is also observable: ASIC tends to describe phoenix 
activity as ‘illegal phoenix activity’ whereas the ATO tends to use the term ‘fraudulent 
phoenix activity’. It may be a difference without a distinction, but even this difference 
in approach points to a fundamental lack of consistency.  
2.1.2. A SCHOLARLY APPROACH: KEY INDICATORS OF PHOENIX ACTIVITY 
Phoenix activity is not a new38 nor uniquely Australian problem.39 Internationally, it is 
variously described and can fall within the scope of strategic insolvency and enterprise 
liability. 40  Scholarly research into phoenix activity in Australia demonstrates the 
difficulty in settling upon a single definition of phoenix activity lies primarily with the 
vast range of forms that phoenix activity may take.41 Most scholarly literature tends to 
                                   
36	ASIC,	Small	Business	–	Illegal	Phoenix	Activity,	n	35.		
37	ASIC,	Small	Business	–	Illegal	Phoenix	Activity,	n	35.	
38	Tomasic,	‘Phoenix	Companies	and	Rogue	Directors’,	n	10.		
39	Roach,	n	9	at	94.	
40	See	Brown	D,	 ‘Law	Reform	 in	New	Zealand:	Towards	 a	 trans‐Tasman	 insolvency	 law’	
(2007)	 15	 Insolv	 LJ	 148,	 149‐151,	 169‐171;	 Finch	 V,	 ‘Corporate	 Rescue:	 A	 game	 of	 3	
halves’	(2012)	32(2)	Legal	Studies	302;	Wellard	M,	and	Walton	P,	‘A	comparative	analysis	
of	Anglo	Australian	pre‐packs:	Can	the	means	be	made	to	justify	the	ends?’	(2012)	21	Int	
Insol	 Rev	 143;	 Anderson	 H,	 ‘Directors’	 liability	 for	 fraudulent	 phoenix	 activity	 –	 a	
comparison	of	the	Australian	and	UK	approaches’	(2014)	14	(1)	Journal	of	Corporate	Law	
Studies		139;	Roach,	n	9	at	94.	
41	See	Anderson,	The	Proposed	Deterrence	of	Phoenix	Activity,	n	10	at	412	where	phoenix	
activity	is	described	as	a	concept	broadly	centering	on	the	notion	of	‘a	new	company	rising	
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favour an approach that explains key behaviours indicative of phoenix activity rather 
than the formulation of a prescriptive definition. As Anderson explains, phoenix activity 
is ‘notoriously difficult to define’.42  
There is scholarly consensus that the key indicator of phoenix activity is deliberate 
abuse of the corporate form to avoid legal obligations.43 Phoenix activity exploits the 
legal status of limited liability companies as separate legal entities. While it is usually a 
newly formed, small limited liability company with nominal issued, paid up capital that 
engages in illegal phoenix activity, 44 larger companies may be involved where the 
phoenix activity takes place within the confines of a corporate group.45 Whether the 
companies involved are large or small, the abuse is typically to use the separate legal 
entity and limited liability of the new company to avoid the legal obligations of the 
previous company.46 This may be achieved through a deliberate manipulation of the law 
to the best advantage of the business and at the peril of the creditors of the company. 
The companies involved may have the same directors or shareholders. These key 
indicators of phoenix activity combine to shield directors avoiding legal obligations. 
The legal obligation typically avoided is payment of debts owed to unsecured creditors, 
such as payment of taxes or employee entitlements. The phoenix company may use a 
                                                                                                      
from	 the	 ashes	 of	 its	 failed	 predecessor’,	 and	 amounting	 to	 an	 ‘exploitation	 of	 the	
corporate	 form	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 creditors’;	 See	 also	 Morrison,	 n	 10	 at	 234	 where	
Morrison	notes	that	a	phoenix	company	may	be	identified	by	reference	to	a	consideration	
of	the	size	of	the	company,	its	legal	obligations	and	the	directors’	use	of	the	corporate	form	
to	avoid	performance	of	those	legal	obligations	to	another	company:	a	phoenix	operation	
is	 typically	 a	 limited	 liability,	 private,	 with	 nominal	 issued	 paid	 up	 capital.	 See	 also	
Tomasic,	‘Phoenix	Companies	and	Rogue	Directors’,	n	10	at	476.	
42	Anderson,	The	Proposed	Deterrence	of	Phoenix	Activity,	n	10	at	412.	
43	Anderson,	The	Proposed	Deterrence	of	Phoenix	Activity,	n	10	at	412;	Morrison,	n	10	at	
234;	Tomasic,	 ‘Phoenix	 Companies	 and	Rogue	Directors’,	 n	10	 at	 476;	Roach,	 n	9	 at	 91;	
Coburn,	n	10	at	1‐3;	Rotem,	n	10	at	3‐4;	Symes	and	Simpson,	n	10	at	227.	
44	Anderson,	The	Proposed	Deterrence	of	Phoenix	Activity,	n	10	at	412.		
45	See	 Tomasic,	 ‘Phoenix	 Companies	 and	 Rogue	 Directors’,	 n	 10	 at	 476;	 McConvill	 J,	
‘Revisiting	 Holding	 Company	 Liability	 for	 Subsidiary	 Company	 Debts	 in	 Australia:	 A	
response	 to	 the	 James	Hardie	 Controversy’	 (2005)	 7	UNDALR	 23;	 Dickfos	 J,	 ‘Enterprise	
Liability	 for	 Corporate	 Groups:	 A	 more	 efficient	 outcome	 for	 creditors’	 (2011)	 25	
Australian	Journal	of	Corporate	Law	242.	
46	Morrison,	n	10	at	234,	referring	to	Tomasic,	‘Phoenix	Companies	and	Rogue	Directors’,	n	
10.	
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name deceptively similar to that of the previous company. The use of a deceptively 
similar name may be an implicit part of the scheme to defraud creditors: 
Often because the new company has a similar name and even the same address, 
creditors mistake it for the old company and fail to recognise that the company that is 
trading (the new company) is not the company that owes them their debts. It may be 
some time until this is realised by the creditor and by this time their true debtor (the old 
company) is completely worthless.47  
It is unlikely that all key indicators will be present.  For example, Anderson notes that 
phoenixing between corporate groups does not necessarily involve the creation of a new 
entity.48 Similarly, the directors of the failed company need not be directors of the 
phoenix company.  
Phoenix activity is not always illegal. It is not necessarily illegal for a business to fail. 
Nor is it illegal for a business to fail and to try again.49 This is a normative approach to 
business failure in capitalist economies that reflects critical legal and economic policy 
supportive of entrepreneurship and efficient markets. 50  These norms ought to be 
reflected in the development of law addressing phoenix activity since they highlight the 
importance of the distinction between legal and illegal phoenix activity.  
                                   
47	Quilter	M,	Company	Law	Perspectives	(Thomson	Reuters,	2012),	107.	
48	Anderson,	The	Proposed	Deterrence	of	Phoenix	Activity,	n	10	at	412.	
49	See	discussion	of	this	point	in	Roach,	n	9	at	91.	
50	Toporowski	J,	‘Corporate	limited	liability	and	the	financial	liabilities	of	firms’	(2010)	34	
Cambridge	 Journal	 of	 Economics	 885;	 Easterbrook	 F,	 and	 Fischel	 D,	 The	 Economic	
Structure	of	Corporate	Law	(Harvard	University	Press,	1991),	12‐13;	Pagano	M,	and	Volpin	
P,	‘The	Political	Economy	of	Corporate	Governance’	(2005)	95	(4)	The	American	Economic	
Review	 1005;	 Wennekers	 S,	 and	 Thurik	 R,	 ‘Linking	 entrepreneurship	 and	 economic	
growth’	(1999)	13	Small	Business	Economics	13;	Endres	A,	and	Harper	D,	‘The	kinetics	of	
capital	formation	and	economic	organisation’	(2012)	36	Cambridge	Journal	of	Economics	
963;	 Konzelmann	 S,	 et	 al,	 ‘Governance,	 regulation	 and	 financial	 market	 instability:	 the	
implications	for	policy’	(2009)	34	Cambridge	Journal	of	Economics	929;	Blankenburg	S,	et	
al,	‘Limited	liability	and	the	modern	corporation	in	practice’	(2010)	34	Cambridge	Journal	
of	Economics	821;	Muchlinski	P,	‘Limited	liability	and	multinational	enterprises:	a	case	for	
reform?’	(2010)	34	Cambridge	Journal	of	Economics	91.	
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Legal phoenix activity has been described as the legal and honest resurrection of a 
company or revival of its business.51 ASIC describes legal phoenix activity in terms of 
genuine business failure that does not involve illegal phoenix activity.52 The hallmark of 
legal phoenix activity is honesty; intention is the critical distinction between legal and 
illegal phoenix activity.53 This is not to suggest that the distinction is an easy one. This 
compounds the difficulties arising in isolating a singular definition of phoenix activity. 
The motivations underlying phoenix activity have not been explored in scholarly 
literature to date, and are likely to be as various as the forms that phoenix activity may 
take. A phoenix operation may leave some creditors behind perhaps motivated by a 
desire to protect the interests of others, to gain a competitive edge, or simply to survive. 
The subjective intention of those involved may be somewhat difficult to determine, and 
objective intention will vary infinitely with the circumstances of the case. It is easier to 
recognise illegality where phoenix activity involves rogues, fraudsters or those who act 
with a cavalier disregard for the legality of their behavior. Roach suggests that phoenix 
activity is illegal when directors take ‘unfair advantage’ of both the separate legal entity 
of the corporation conducting the business and the limited liability afforded by the 
structure of the corporation.54  
A glimpse of what might motivate a director considering phoenix activity arose in ASIC 
v Somerville (2009) 259 ALR 574. His Honour Justice Windeyer quoted from the 
transcript taken in the ASIC examination of one of the directors involved: 
Question: Whose idea was it to enter another sale of business 
agreement? Was it your idea or was it Mr Somerville’s? 
Answer: Well I went to him to discuss my position and he said, ‘Do 
it again’. I said, ‘It sounds a bit rich’. But he said, ‘No, it’s 
                                   
51	Fair	Work	Ombudsman	Report,	n	1	at	57.	
52	ASIC,	Small	Business	–	Illegal	Phoenix	Activity,	n	35.	
53	See	Fair	Work	Ombudsman	Report,	 n	 1	 at	 56‐57;	 see	 also	Anderson	 et	 al,	Defining	and	
Profiling	Phoenix	Activity,	n	9	at	8‐9.	
54	Roach,	n	9	at	94.	
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alright’. 
Question: When you said ‘It sounds a bit rich’ what were you 
thinking? 
Answer: Well, you feel as though you are walking away from 
liabilities without paying, right, which I don’t like doing. 
But the option was to stop working and have absolutely no 
future in making money at all so that’s what I did. Either 
way, the only hope of getting money to these people was to 
continue to work. 
Question: In your own words what was the purpose behind this 
agreement? 
Answer: Well, I couldn’t continue if they were going to wind the 
company up so I had to have a means of trading. I had to 
have a few assets that it owned to use.55 
Irrespective of legality, phoenix activity is generally offensive to moral standards of 
behaviour. This is predominantly because phoenix activity does not just involve a failed 
business leaving behind unpaid debts or other outstanding legal obligations. It typically 
also involves the phoenix, that is, the new corporate entity, competing in the same 
market, at a deliberately crafted competitive edge - it is now debt free. One would 
expect the law to be intolerant of illegal phoenix activity, despite any difficulties that 
might arise in isolating a singular definition of the illegality.56  
2.2. DEFINITION BY OSTENSION 
Phoenix activity resists a singular, comprehensive definition. In such circumstances, 
definition by ostension can be usefully deployed. Ostension in legal reasoning is most 
effective where an abstract statement of a legal concept or principle fails to fully capture 
                                   
55	ASIC	v	Somerville	(2009)	259	ALR	574,	at	584‐585.	
56	ASC,	Phoenix	Companies	and	Insolvent	Trading,	n	1	at	56‐58.	
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and explain the principle itself. 57 This approach to legal reasoning may be of assistance 
in identifying and articulating the legal principles underlying the illegality of phoenix 
activity. Definition by ostension assists to develop an understanding the concept or 
principle through the giving of examples of the practical operation of the law: ‘The 
process at work is to some extent like the process at work when a child comes to 
understand what “red” means by having red things pointed out.’58 Consider for example 
the approach to legal reasoning taken in articulating and understanding the scope of the 
term ‘unconsconability’ in Waltons Stores v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 where 
Brennan J stated that an exhaustive definition of unconscionable behaviour was 
impossible and unnecessary, yet certain minimum factors could be identified.59 It may 
not be necessary for the definition to extend beyond identification of those certain 
minimum elements; rather a better approach may be to:  
treat the cases themselves as providing an ostensive definition of when the relevant type 
of unconsciontiousness occurs, and also to apply equitable principles that apply even 
outside the area of equitable estoppel but are capable of application within it.60 
This logic could be extended to phoenix activity if certain key elements can be 
identified and then explored through the variety of forms in which the illegality may 
arise. Campbell J, a vocal proponent of ostension, has explained the value of ostensive 
definition and the circumstances in which an ostensive definition might be appropriate, 
namely, where: 
[I]t is not possible to give a neat formula which states the degree of specificity or 
generality with which the use which gives rise to a prescriptive easement, and hence the 
easement itself should be described. That is a topic concerning which the law involves 
                                   
57	Campbell	 J,	 ‘Some	 aspects	 of	 the	 practical	 operation	 of	 litigation	 relating	 to	 deceased	
estates	–	Part	3’	(2007)	10(1)	REP	54,	55.	
58	Sanpine	 v	Koompahtoo	 Local	Aboriginal	 Land	 Council	 [2005]	 NSWSC	 365,	 [177],	 per	
Campbell	J.	
59Waltons	Stores	(Interstate)	Ltd	v	Maher	(1988)	164	CLR	387,	419;	Campbell	J,	‘Waltons	v	
Maher:	History,	Unconscientiousness	and	remedy‐	the	‘minimum	equity’	(2013)	7	Journal	
of	Equity	171,	200.		
60	Campbell	J,	‘Waltons	v	Maher:	History,	Unconscientiousness	and	remedy‐	the	‘minimum	
equity’	n	51	at	200.	
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not just a rule or principle, but a method of reasoning which can be grasped only 
through examples. 61  
One of the difficulties with a isolating a definition of phoenix activity is that the range 
of behaviour that might amount to phoenix activity is wide; there is a spectrum of 
phoenix activity the ambit of which encompasses legal, illegal, moral and immoral 
conduct. This can be seen through examples of phoenix activity identified in case law 
and ASIC investigations. Several examples will be considered.  
ILLEGAL PHOENIX ACTIVITY  
The predominant key indicator of phoenix activity is the deliberate abuse of the 
corporate form to avoid legal responsibility. This is demonstrated in the examples 
considered below. These examples illustrate the range of behaviour that can amount to 
phoenix activity and that the law as it currently stands is capable of capturing some, if 
not all, of it. Each example involves business failure and demonstrates that phoenix 
activity is morally reprehensible to the extent that it amounts to a deliberate scheme to 
avoid creditors. 
3. EXAMPLES REVEALING KEY INDICATORS OF PHOENIX ACTIVITY 
3.1. CONTRAVENTION OF INDUSTRIAL LAWS PROTECTING EMPLOYEE 
ENTITLEMENTS 
In Fairwork Ombudsman v Humidfresh Industries Pty Ltd [2012] FMCA 954, the Fair 
Work Ombudsman sought declarations of contravention and orders for the imposition 
of pecuniary penalties against North, a director of a company in liquidation, 
Humidifresh. The shareholders of this company were North, his brother and his father. 
Prior to the liquidation of Humidifresh, North set up a new company of which he was 
the sole director. The new company carried out a similar business to that of 
Humidifresh. A number of employees of Humidifresh were not paid severance to which 
                                   
61	Maher	v	Bayview	Golf	Club	[2004]	NSWSC	275,	[57].	See	also	paragraphs	[39]‐[56]	for	an	
analysis	by	ostension.	
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they were entitled. The Ombudsman argued that this amounted to illegal phoenix 
activity and the Court agreed:  
For directors and shareholders of small enterprises to abandon their obligations in the 
process of closing one company and then, phoenix-like, to rise with the next, continuing 
what is in essence the same style of business, is unacceptable. To allow them to leave in 
their wake a trail of unpaid wages and benefits damages, in the knowledge that there 
would be no direct recourse, to me seems counterintuitive. It would incentivise directors 
to fail in the fulfilment of a director’s proper obligations in the conduct of enterprises 
such as this where the value of unpaid wages and benefits far exceeded the maximum 
penalty that could be imposed.62 
The key identifier of phoenix activity in this case was deliberate abuse of the corporate 
form to avoid the performance of legal obligations. The relevant legal obligations were 
the payment of employees’ statutory entitlements. The illegality arose because by 
failing to make these payments Humidifresh was in contravention of the Fair Work 
(Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 2009 (Cth). 63  In 
accordance with Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 550(1) North’s admitted involvement in 
the contraventions of Humidifresh amounted itself to a contravention for which North 
was personally liable to a pecuniary penalty.64  
3.2. MANAGEMENT OF MULTIPLE FAILED COMPANIES  
Disqualification from the management of companies is a powerful weapon in ASIC’s 
arsenal against illegal phoenix activity.65 Persistent business failure may indicate that 
something more than bad entrepreneurial luck is involved. The law is supportive of 
close examination of persistent failure to ensure that the companies were being 
managed appropriately, and that the business failure has been honest and free of 
                                   
62	[2012]	FMCA	954	[21].	
63	Item	2(1)	of	Schedule	16.	
64	[2012]	FMCA	954.	
65	Corporations	Act	2001	(Cth),	s	206F.	
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behaviour that transgresses the law. The liquidator’s investigation is likely to reveal 
questionable or illegal behaviour.  
In Grossman v ASIC [2011] AATA 6, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed 
ASIC’s exercise of its power under Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 206F to disqualify 
Grossman from managing corporations for five years. Grossman had been a director of 
three failed companies within a seven year period. In each case the company had been 
wound up unable to pay its debts. The key indicator of illegal phoenix activity was 
abuse of the corporate form to avoid legal obligations: payment of statutory liabilities 
including taxes. The Tribunal noted that Grossman’s conduct in relation to the 
management, business or property of the companies, potentially amounted to 
contraventions of officers’ duties, insolvent trading and uncommercial transactions. 
This manifested in a series of transactions whereby the business of one company was 
transferred to another company shortly before the first company failed. In each case, 
Grossman was a director of the transferee company. The Tribunal found that while there 
is no legal obligation on a transferee to take responsibility for the unpaid creditors of the 
business being transferred, such transfers are not tolerated by the law where the transfer 
is for the purpose of avoiding the payment of tax or other statutory liabilities.66  
The phoenix activity in Grossman was cyclical.67 The assets of the first company were 
transferred to the second company for the purpose of avoiding unsecured debts. The 
transfer occurred at a time when Grossman was the sole director of both companies. The 
circumstances involving the failure of the third company were more complex. 
Grossman was one of the three directors of the third company, Bico Designs. Five days 
before the appointment of an external administrator, the business of Bico Designs was 
transferred to Bico Australia Pty Ltd, a company formed 14 days prior to the 
transaction, of which Grossman was a director. While a large sum of money was paid 
for the business, the Tribunal agreed with ASIC’s assessment of this transaction as an 
uncommercial phoenix-like transaction conducted for the purpose of avoiding the tax 
                                   
66	[2011]	AATA	6	at	[50].	
67	[2011]	AATA	6.	
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and other statutory liabilities of Bico Designs. 68   ASIC imposed the maximum 
disqualification allowed under s 206F because it characterised Grossman’s behaviour as 
‘involving a lack of commercial morality, having a disregard for the interests of 
creditors, preference of his own interests over the interests of creditors, and repeated 
misuse of the corporate structure’.69 The Tribunal affirmed that this was appropriate.70 
Disqualification under s 206F may also be justified where the liquidator’s report or 
ASIC’s investigation reveals falsification of records or a failure to assist the liquidator. 
Gazal was banned by ASIC from managing companies for five years following an 
investigation of Gazal’s involvement in six failed companies that manufactured and sold 
caravans.• 71  In each case the failed company was wound up. ASIC’s investigation 
revealed a failure to maintain adequate financial records, false financial records, false 
business activity statements, a failure to assist liquidators in winding up and ‘phoenix 
activity whereby the caravan business continued under a new corporate entity minus the 
liabilities of the failed entity’.72 ASIC claimed the newly formed companies had similar 
names. 73  Each company was involved in the business of manufacturing or selling 
‘Viscount Caravans’. The total of the unpaid debts of the six failed companies 
amounted to over $13M. Unsatisfied creditors included customers, trade creditors and 
statutory liabilities. ASIC’s Executive Director of Consumer Protection, Mr Greg 
Tanzer noted: ‘Mr Gazal’s lack of commercial morality resulted in a substantial loss to 
                                   
68	[2011]	AATA	6	at	[90],	[98],	[108].	
69	[2011]	AATA	6	at	[115].	
70	[2011]	AATA	6	at	[130].	
71	ASIC,	 ASIC	 bans	 Sydney	 Caravan	 Operator,	 Media	 Release	 07‐19,	 30	 January	 2007	
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/07‐
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73	The	names	of	the	corporate	entities	were:	Gazal	Leisure	Pty	Ltd,	Viscount	Manufacturing	
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Goldstream	Caravan	Manufacturing	Pty	Ltd	and	Gazal	Caravans	Pty	Ltd.	
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creditors which is why we’ve imposed the maximum disqualification penalty’.74 ASIC 
considered that the cyclical use of entities with similar names to avoid creditors of the 
old companies amounted to illegal phoenix activity.75  
This example demonstrates that an ostensive definition may prove more powerful than 
an exhaustive definition. Again, the key indicator of illegal phoenix activity was 
deliberate abuse of the corporate form to avoid the payment of debts. A further indicator 
was the cyclical pattern of illegal behaviour emerging from repeated business failure. 
This illegality manifested in the falsification of financial records and business 
statements, and failure to assist the liquidator in winding up.  
Two further factors arise that may be relevant in future consideration of phoenix 
activity. First, while it is arguable whether the company names used in the Gazal case 
were remarkably similar, there is no doubt that the name of the product being 
manufactured did not change. This is not a feature of phoenix activity that has been 
incorporated in any attempt to define phoenix activity to date. Secondly, ASIC appears 
to have linked the lack of commercial morality to the gravity of the offence. It ought not 
be necessary to import a requirement of commercial morality into the identification of 
illegal phoenix activity. Principles of corporate social responsibility, good faith and 
unconscionability aside, there is no law that directly requires a company to act in 
accordance with commercial morality, at least in its general sense.76 However behaviour 
that does not conform with notions of commercial morality, in its general sense, may 
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imperil the public interest and may form the basis of an application to have the company 
wound up.77  
The blurring of the lines between immoral and illegal activity is closely related to the 
difficulty distinguishing illegal and legal phoenix activity. Immorality was strongly 
linked to phoenix activity in the 1996 ASC Report, Phoenix Activities and Insolvent 
Trading.78 This report based its estimates of the economic cost of phoenix activity on a 
variety of sources including a telephone survey of SMEs. 96% of respondents 
considered phoenix activity to be immoral.79  
3.3. WINDING UP 
The court has a number of sources of power to wind up a company. The powers of the 
court under sections 461(1)(k) and 447A are both relevant in addressing illegal phoenix 
activity.  
3.3.1. WINDING UP ON JUST AND EQUITABLE GROUNDS: SECTION 461(1)(k) 
Where phoenix activity presents as long term, systematic disregard for the interests of 
creditors, it may be possible to have the presently trading phoenix company wound up 
on just and equitable grounds pursuant to Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 461(1)(k), 
even if the company is still solvent. This was the case in Deputy Commissioner of 
Taxation v Casualife Furniture International Pty Ltd (2004) 9 VR 549 (‘Casualife’). 
Section 461(1)(k) empowers the court to wind up a company where it is just and 
equitable to do so. A creditor may make application for such an order.80 The ATO is 
well positioned to make such an application for two reasons. Firstly, if the company is 
currently trading and has employees, the Commissioner may be a contingent if not 
                                   
77	See	Deputy	Commissioner	of	Taxation	v	Casualife	Furniture	International	Pty	Ltd	(2004)	9	
VR	549	and	Deputy	Commissioner	of	Taxation	v	Woodings	(1995)	13	WAR	189,	discussed	
below;	See	also	Harris,	J,	‘The	Constitutional	Basis	of	s	447A:	Is	it	a	power	without	limit?’	
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78	ASC,	Phoenix	Companies	and	Insolvent	Trading,	n	1.	
79	ASC,	Phoenix	Companies	and	Insolvent	Trading,	n	1	at	58‐60.		
80	Corporations	Act	2001	(Cth),	s	461(1)(k)	
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present creditor of the company.  Secondly, the ATO is in the advantageous position of 
having access to information that will assist in making out a prima facie case for 
winding up.81 In Casualife the Deputy Commissioner’s claim relied upon information 
gathered over a 20 year period. 
 The Deputy Commissioner claimed that companies under the control of the Guss 
family had owned and operated the same furniture business for 20 years. That business 
was currently being operated by the two solvent defendant companies. A pattern of 
conduct was evident. A company operating the furniture business would trade, incurring 
tax liabilities and other debts. The company would then transfer all its assets, including 
stock in trade, plant, equipment and employees to a new company, often with a similar 
name, which would continue to operate the same or a similar furniture business from the 
same premises. The first company would be wound up leaving behind unpaid debts, 
including the tax debt. The Deputy Commissioner claimed this cycle had been repeated 
for over 20 years. This is a classic example of multiple key indicators of phoenix 
activity: cyclical abuse of the corporate form to avoid payment of debts, while 
continuing to operate the same business under a new company, trading debt free.  
The claim for winding up under s 461(1)(k) was made on three grounds. Firstly, the 
Deputy Commissioner lacked confidence in the conduct and management of the 
companies specifically in relation to the conduct of the furniture business. Secondly, 
fairness dictated that the companies be wound up. Thirdly, it was conducive to 
commercial morality and public interest to wind up the companies so that the company 
could be brought under the control of a liquidator and so that further commercial 
immorality could be prevented.82  
The Court took a broad view of what was ‘just and equitable’. While, the threshold for 
what may amount to just and equitable grounds is higher when dealing with a solvent 
company, that higher threshold is more likely to be met where the matter involves 
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82	(2004)	9	VR	549	at	570.	
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systematic, recurring conduct.83 The approach of the Court suggests that winding up on 
just and equitable grounds can be a valuable tool in ending the cycle of phoenix activity. 
The Court looked for a clear nexus between the management and administration of the 
present companies and the facts and conduct relied upon by the Deputy Commissioner 
in claiming that winding up was just and equitable. This brought into the sharp focus the 
conduct of certain Guss family members behind the companies that had operated the 
business over the entire period. The Guss’ approach to corporate, directorial and 
management responsibilities was described by the Court as disgraceful and revealing of 
an uncaring and brazen attitude to creditors of the liquidated companies.84 The Court 
was satisfied that the Deputy Commissioner’s lack of confidence in the companies’ 
likely observance of their tax obligations was justified. The pubic interest in making the 
winding up order was collection of Commonwealth revenue. A critical concern was that 
the companies’ business was still trading and had employees.  The Court ordered that 
the companies be wound up noting: 
It is in the public interest and conducive to commercial morality that the companies be 
wound up, both to prevent the perpetration of further commercial immorality and for the 
benefit of having the companies under the control of a liquidator.85 
3.3.2. SUCH ORDERS AS THE COURT THINKS APPROPRIATE: SECTION 447A 
In Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Woodings (1995) 13 WAR 189, the Court 
exercised its power under Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s447A to wind up a company. 
The Court was satisfied that it was in the public interest that the company be wound up 
since this would not allow the company to be further manipulated by Morris, a director 
of the company. 86   Two businesses had been operated by a series of companies 
controlled by Morris, or people closely associated with him including employees, his 
mother, sister and brother in law. The first company would incur debts only to be 
stripped of its assets, which were sold to another company controlled by Morris or his 
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associates. The first company would then be wound up leaving behind unpaid debts, 
including tax debts. The Deputy Commissioner contended that this behaviour was 
systematic and that it was in the public interest to wind up the company to prevent 
continued commercial immorality; if the company was not wound up the behaviour was 
almost certain to continue.   
An administrator of the company had recommended to a meeting of creditors that a 
Deed of Company arrangement be executed. At that time neither the administrator nor 
all the creditors knew that Morris had offered some, but not all, creditors additional 
money for their proxy votes. Those proxy votes were exercised by Morris at the 
meeting. Had the Court simply set aside the Deed, the company would have continued 
to operate under Morris’ control. 
The key indicators of phoenix activity present here were cyclical abuse of the corporate 
form to avoid payment of debts, while continuing to operate the same business under a 
new company. The new company was now at a strategic advantage over its competitors 
in the market, since it was trading debt free of the debts of the previous company. The 
scheme was elaborate in that Morris used a range of structures and associates through 
which to control the business at the centre of activity. 
3.4. INSOLVENT TRADING AND UNCOMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
Since illegal phoenix activity may be triggered by an imminent or actual solvency crisis, 
one would expect to see more cases of insolvent trading and uncommercial transactions 
in bringing those engaged in phoenix activity to task. However, there are very few cases 
in this regard. One example involving both insolvent trading and uncommercial asset 
stripping is HWY Rent Pty Ltd v HWY Rentals (in liq) (No 2) [2014] FCA 449. HWY 
Rent Pty Ltd conducted a car and truck rental business. Mr Jarvie was the company’s 
sole director and shareholder until he was declared bankrupt.  At that time his mother, 
Mrs Jarvie became the director of the company and Mr Jarvie remained sole 
shareholder. Immediately upon the annulment of his bankruptcy, a new company was 
formed, HWY Rentals Pty Ltd (No 2); Mr Jarvie was the sole director and shareholder 
of the new company. All the assets of the first company were transferred to the new 
company. Two years after the annulment of his bankruptcy, Mr Jarvie resumed his role 
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as a director of the first company. The Court found that Mr and Mrs Jarvie were in 
breach of fiduciary duties to the first company, they had contravened their duty to avoid 
insolvent trading pursuant to s 588G(2) by failing to prevent the first company from 
incurring tax obligations while insolvent, and that the transfer of assets amounted to an 
uncommercial transaction under s 588FB.87  
The key identifier of illegal phoenix activity here was abuse of the corporate form: Mr 
and Mrs Jarvie had acted in disregard for the interests of creditors and had instead 
preferred Mr Jarvie’s interests through asset stripping and insolvent trading. This had 
been facilitated through the creation of a new, similarly named, entity to carry on the 
business of the first entity.  
Financial distress may be a precursor to phoenix activity. Businesses in financial 
distress typically demonstrate a range of financial and other symptoms of an impending 
solvency crisis. Adams and Jones argue that these symptoms such as poor management 
and inadequate financial records can serve as warning signs to creditors, shareholders 
and directors of the company.88  Records may be fraudulent, featuring non-existent 
assets,89 or woefully inadequate.90  In ASC v Forem-Freeway Enterprises Pty Ltd,91 
Madgwick J, in disqualifying a director for insolvent trading, expressed little doubt that 
ultimately the director’s intention was to phoenix and to continue via some other entity 
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90	ASC	v	Forem‐Freeway	Enterprises	Pty	Ltd	(1999)	30	ACSR	339	at	351.	
91	(1999)	30	ACSR	339.	
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or entities, including his own name.92 Morton was the sole director and shareholder of 
Forem-Freeway, a company carrying on a business assembling and selling personal 
computers. Forem Freeway radically undercut the pricing of competitors; it was a 
business model that relied upon high turn over and low profit margins. The Court was 
satisfied that the company was actually insolvent throughout a period where customer 
orders continued to be taken. Further the company’s financial records were in such a 
state of disarray, that the Court was satisfied that even if the company had not been 
actually insolvent, the presumption of insolvency in s 588E(3) could not be rebutted. 
There was no general ledger, no cashbook, and no informal record that might indicate 
incoming and outgoing payments. Banking records provided an incomplete picture 
since cash receipts were not always deposited into the company’s account, and were 
instead kept on the premises and used to pay staff and suppliers. The Court described 
the bookkeeping as chaotic93 and the method of trading as fundamentally unsound.94 
The ASC sought to disqualify Morton from managing companies for 30 years; though 
the Court determined that a 12 year disqualification was more appropriate given 
Morton’s youth.95 The potential for future abuse of limited liability was one of the 
reasons given for disqualification.96 
At the time of the trial, Morton was continuing a similar business as a sole trader. Is this 
phoenix activity? Is there an abuse of the corporate form if no second company 
continues the business, or a strikingly similar one? Arguably so, if the business trades 
on, free of the debts of the first company. The Court noted that there was no overt intent 
to defraud customers, but the failure to comprehend the precarious nature of a seriously 
undercapitalised business coupled with a cavalier disregard of ordinary commercial 
morality in dealing with the company’s customers was both unreasonable and 
dishonest: ‘The boundary between self deception as to the company’s prospects and 
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conscious deception of its customers had been crossed’.97 Madgwick J was unconvinced 
that continuing a similar business as a sole trader and assuming personal liability for the 
debts of the business showed any net improvement in commercial conduct. 98 However, 
it is arguable that it is less offensive to commercial morality to avoid the debts of the 
first company in circumstances where the business is continued in a manner that places 
new personal risk on the table. This is because, generally, it is personal risk that phoenix 
activity seeks to avoid through strategic use of limited liability entities. 
3.5. CONTRAVENTION OF STATUTORY DUTIES IN THE CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 
(CTH)  
One of the circumstances in which the behaviour underlying phoenix activity can be 
illegal is when it amounts to a contravention of the statutory duties imposed on directors 
and other officers under Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 180-183. Other persons may 
be involved in contravention of these duties. These other persons might include the 
phoenix entity itself.99 This was the case in Dalmain Holdings Pty Ltd v Rechichi 
[2010] WASC 376. Rechichi, an architect, conducted his business through Dalmain 
Holdings Pty Ltd. Its directors were Rechichi and his parents. The focus of the 
proceedings was a transaction that began with the incorporation of a new company, 
Finetune Holdings Pty Ltd with Rechichi as its sole director. Days after its 
incorporation, Rechichi, as director of Dalmain Holdings, resolved to transfer all the 
business of his practice to the new company. The liquidator instituted proceedings 
seeking compensation for the loss of assets transferred to the new company. Master 
Sanderson noted that the transaction appeared to be phoenix activity; His Honour found 
that the directors of Dalmain Holdings had breached fiduciaries duties and had 
contravened Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss181(1), 182(1) and 183(1).100 Finetune, the 
phoenix entity, was liable as a third party involved in the contravention. Since Rechichi 
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was its sole director, Finetune had taken the assets with full knowledge of the breach of 
duty.101  
Legal, restructuring and insolvency advisers can be liable for their involvement where 
they are complicit in illegal phoenix activity. ASIC considers that such gatekeepers play 
an important role in addressing illegal phoenix activity and has warned that it will act 
against gatekeepers involved in illegal phoenix activity.102 Recent enforcement action 
directed at illegal phoenix activity includes the prosecution of an accountant who had 
provided pre-appointment insolvency advice,103 and a lawyer implicit in designing and 
implementing a phoenix arrangement.104  
In ASIC v Somerville (2009) 259 ALR 574 the court determined the liability of a 
solicitor as a party knowingly involved in various contraventions of the Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth) via a series of transactions. The directors of a number of companies had 
sought legal advice from Somerville. Each of the companies was insolvent or facing a 
real risk of insolvency. Somerville advised the businesses might be salvaged via an 
arrangement where the existing companies could enter into agreements for the sale and 
purchase of their assets to new companies with similar names. The existing companies 
would cease trading. These arrangements were implemented. The assets were 
transferred for consideration in the form of the issue of V class shares in the new 
companies. These shares were issued to the old companies. Holders of V class shares 
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Court,	 19	 February	 2015),	 Brisbane	 Magistrates	 Court	 (Criminal)	 File	 Number	
00026808/14.	See	also	ASIC	Media	Release,	 ‘Gold	Coast	chartered	accountant	sentenced	
following	 ASIC	 investigation’,	 (15031MR,	 Thursday	 15	 Feburary	 2015)	
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104	ASIC	v	Somerville	(2009)	259	ALR	574.	
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were entitled to receive all dividends declared by the old company to a ceiling amount. 
No payment was made to the old company unless dividends were declared by the new 
company. No dividends were ever declared and no payment was ever made. In effect 
the new company obtained the employees and assets of the old company free of debts to 
trade creditors, tax debts and debts for insurance premiums. This appeared to be the 
objective.105  
A key indicator of illegal phoenix activity in this case was abuse of the corporate form 
to allow the business to survive in a manner that deliberately defeated the claims of 
creditors. 106  The creditors included employees. 107  This illegality manifested in the 
contravention of a series of statutory obligations in the course of the restructuring 
designed and implemented by the solicitor to abuse the corporate form to avoid 
creditors. The directors of the old companies were in contravention of statutory 
obligations to exercise their powers in good faith, in the best interests of the corporation 
and for a proper purpose; 108  and to not improperly use their position to gain an 
advantage for themselves or someone else, nor but must they cause detriment to the 
corporation.109 They were also in contravention of their obligation not to improperly use 
information obtained because of their role as a director to gain an advantage for 
themselves or someone else, or to cause detriment to the company. 110  The Court 
analysed the conduct of the corporation, the directors and the lawyer involved in terms 
that focused upon the applicable law, and avoided mention of phoenix activity.111 The 
obligation to act in good faith and to exercise their powers for a proper purpose in 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s181(1) had been contravened since ‘there was no proper 
basis for the transactions other than to keep the benefit of the assets in another company 
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without the burden of liabilities’. 112   Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 182(1) was 
contravened as the directors had gained advantage for themselves and someone else by 
continuing to ‘direct companies which had the use of the transferred assets’. 113 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 183(1) was contravened because each case the 
advantage was gained by the individual director or the company had suffered 
detriment.114  
The Court found that the solicitor was involved in the directors’ contraventions and 
therefore the solicitor himself had contravened the civil penalty provisions in 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 181(2), 182(2) and 183(2). 115 Further, the transactions 
would not have taken place but for the involvement of the solicitor: He had devised the 
phoenix scheme to ‘bring about asset stripping but to attempt to make this seem 
legitimate’; 116  ‘advised on and recommended the transactions’; 117  and he made all 
arrangements for preparation of the documents and their execution. He facilitated the 
illegality despite knowing the facts at all times. The court noted that this knowledge 
distinguished Somerville from the directors of the companies involved, since he could 
not have ever believed that his actions were ‘proper and in accordance with the law’.118  
While contravention of the statutory obligations is one manner in which gatekeepers 
might be prosecuted for involvement in illegal phoenix activity, it is not the only basis 
of gatekeeper liability. Recent successful prosecutions against gatekeepers include DPP 
v Scott. Scott was a chartered account in the business of giving pre-appointment 
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insolvency advice. ASIC had conducted an investigation into the appointment of 
voluntary administrators and administrators under deeds of company arrangement in 
relation to three companies, all clients of Scott’s. It was alleged that Scott had made 
false and misleading statements to ASIC to avoid detection of a phoenix scheme, thus 
obstructing an ASIC investigation. Scott entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to 8 
months imprisonment. The false and misleading information centred around a fictitious 
director that ASIC alleged was invented by Scott’s business partner. Scott used the 
fictitious director in deeds of company arrangements and it was the fictitious director 
that subsequently appointed the administrator and voluntary administrator. In earlier 
proceedings the court had set aside the deeds and appointed independent liquidators to 
wind up the companies involved. 119 
4. THE ROLE OF RELIEF FROM LIABILITY  
Not all behaviour underlying phoenix activity is illegal. Honesty is a distinctive and 
intrinsic feature of legal phoenix activity. The existing law relevant to phoenix activity 
does afford some protection for those acting honestly. This protection arises in the form 
of a discretion of the court to grant relief from liability in certain circumstances. The 
court will consider whether the applicant has acted honestly and whether in all the 
circumstances of the case the person ought fairly to be excused.120 In exercising its 
discretion the court may consider whether there has been a want of propriety, deceptive 
conduct, contrition, the need for general deterrence and the extent to which the 
behaviour has fallen short of required standards.121 Relief may be whole or partial. 122 
Partial relief from liability typically reduces or eliminates any pecuniary penalty or 
period of disqualification from management.123 Relief is frequently sought but rarely 
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completely exonerates the applicant from liability.124 This is perhaps a testament to the 
nature of the cases advanced by ASIC. A threshold difficulty for those seeking relief 
appears to be establishing that they have acted honestly, as opposed to failing to act 
dishonestly.125  
The application for relief from liability can only be made in restricted cases, but among 
them are those that have been considered in this paper as laws useful for addressing 
illegal phoenix activity. They include the duty to avoid insolvent trading,126 and other 
statutory duties incumbent upon officers such as the duty to act in good and in the best 
interests of the company, 127 the duty to exercise their powers and duties with due care 
and diligence,128  and for a proper purpose,129  the duty to not improperly use their 
position, or information obtained in their role, to gain an advantage for themselves or 
someone else, or to cause detriment to the corporation.130  A person may seek relief 
from liability for contravention of these statutory duties under s 1317S. Similarly, relief 
can be granted on precisely the same grounds where the person faces civil proceedings 
for negligence, default, breach of trust or breach of duty in their capacity as an officer, 
employee, auditor, expert, receiver or liquidator of the company.131  
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PART III: CONCLUSIONS 
5. FURTHER LAW REFORM TARGETING THE BEHAVIOUR UNDERLYING PHOENIX 
ACTIVITY IS UNNECESSARY 
This paper has sought to demonstrate that there is an extensive arsenal of existing law 
that can be used to capture illegal phoenix activity. Further law appears unnecessary. 
The law addresses illegal conduct all along the spectrum of phoenix behaviour despite 
the many forms in which the illegality can manifest. 132  The applicable law is so 
extensive that there does not appear to be phoenix conduct which ought to be illegal but 
is not captured by the present law. In this sense there is no gap to be filled by further 
law targeting illegal phoenix activity. The abundance of law that may potentially apply 
suggests that a focus on enforcement and detection would be effective in curbing illegal 
phoenix activity. Moreover, the existing law is appropriate to deal with both legal and 
illegal phoenix behaviour since it distinguishes between honest and dishonest conduct. 
The existing law does not seek to capture legal phoenix activity. Directors acting 
honestly can afford themselves of the opportunity to be relieved of liability.  
The question that remains is whether reform to relieve the detection and enforcement 
burden borne by regulators is warranted. The actions of the key regulators and the other 
members of the Inter-Agency Phoenix Forum reveal that the detection and enforcement 
burden presented by the existing law may be presenting a problem. If we expect 
directors to abide by the law, and we expect regulators to promptly detect transgressions 
and prosecute offenders, then it is axiomatic that the law must be clear. To the extent 
that penalties imposed upon transgressors serve as a deterrent against future offences, 
the law, penalties and their application must be both predictable and timely. Support for 
these propositions is found in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. 
133 Common among them is the necessary application of the rule of law. One of the 
difficulties with a singular definition of phoenix activity is that it casts the rule of law as 
a moveable feast; the various legal principles and laws applied depend upon the nature 
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of the particular activity involved, and whether the matter is prosecuted by the 
Department of Public Prosecutions, or brought by ASIC or a liquidator.   
There is no single definition of phoenix activity, and there may not need to be since the 
underlying activity is already illegal pursuant to existing law. While the rule of law 
accommodates the dynamic evolution of law, it requires clarity; persons subject to the 
law must have fair notice as to what the law is in order for there to be any natural justice 
in their being held accountable for their transgressions.134 This is particularly important 
when the purpose of the various penalty regimes in the company, tax and industrial 
relations statutes includes consequences of contravention that are intended to serve as a 
general and personal deterrent. Uncertainty is a factor that weakens the preventative 
effect of prospective punishment as a deterrent: ‘punishment can be preventative only 
when the idea of it, and of its connexion with the crime, is present to the mind. Now, to 
be present, it must be remembered; and to be remembered, it must have been learnt.’135 
So there must not only be clarity of the law itself, but clear communication of it to those 
who are required by law to obey it. This is missing in the present approach to phoenix 
activity. The plethora of definitions confuses matters when ‘phoenix activity’ is not 
illegal per se.  
ASIC Commissioner, Greg Tanzer, has explained the various definitions developed by 
individual members of the forum as the result of each regulatory agency having their 
own focus and therefore having developed their ‘own criteria for regulating this type of 
activity’.136 The array of definitions may exist for good reason, but by virtue of their 
existing as an array, may muddy the waters as to precisely what is the illegality of the 
behaviour. This points to the utility and limitations of existing legal frameworks, since 
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above all else the law should be clear, particularly where one of the objectives of the 
law is deterrence. 
Deterrence is a critical goal of key regulators and government agencies dealing with 
phoenix activity. ASIC is involved in a range of programs it identifies as focused on 
proactively ‘disrupting and deterring illegal phoenix activity’,137 including: the director 
disqualification and liquidator assistance programs; the Assetless Administration Fund; 
the winding up of abandoned companies; and a national surveillance campaign targeting 
those most likely to engage in phoenix activity. 138  The latter of these programs 
commenced in 2013. It sought to identify directors that have a history of involvement in 
the management of failed companies where there have been allegations of phoenix 
activity. In April 2014, Tanzer reported that through this campaign, ASIC had 
identified, thus far, 2500 directors falling within the campaign’s target group.139 The 
regulatory campaign is most interesting for what happens after a director is identified as 
falling within the target group. Tanzer describes this secondary stage as working to 
deter directors from engaging in illegal phoenix activity by, ‘using intelligence from a 
variety of sources to ascertain which of the current companies are in, or tracking 
towards, financial distress’.140 
Timely detection and enforcement of the existing law would communicate a powerful 
message essential for both effective deterrence of illegal activity and the promotion of 
economic confidence in the continued support for legal business failure. This is not to 
suggest that detection of phoenix activity is an easy task. There is little doubt that 
breach of the existing law is difficult and expensive to detect; and this is a significant 
burden when regulators have shrinking budgets and are rapidly losing feet on the 
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ground.  The economic cost of phoenix activity in Australia is estimated to be up to $3 
billion per annum.141 Figures such as these justify generous increases to regulatory 
budgets to support detection and enforcement of the existing law. If there is to be any 
further reform, it should not add to the existing law targeting the behaviour underlying 
phoenix activity, but instead should focus upon relieving the detection and enforcement 
burden borne by regulators. 
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